Formation of Spatial Identities in the Border Region

T.N. Kuveneva, A.G. Manakov

The aim of this study is to identify the role of ethnic, historical-cultural, political, and contemporary administrative borders in the formation and dynamics of territorial identities at different hierarchical levels. To approach the main task of the research, we had to answer a number of questions. What factors influence people’s territorial identification? What connection exists between territorial, political, and ethnic identity? What is the hierarchy of territorial identity? What role in the collective identification of the population is assigned to national (state), regional, and local identity? These questions defined no less significant tasks of our research.

Regional identity is traditionally considered one of the levels of territorial identity. At the same time, national identity in everyday understanding is usually associated with ethnic identity. However, the scientific category of “national identity” only seemingly exists in a different plane from the concept of “regional identity.” With the emergence of the concept of “nation-state” in European science in the 19th century, the now-classical political-geographical triad of “state – nation – territory” [1] was born, which not only linked national and political identities but also placed national identity on the “upper floor” of the hierarchy of territorial identities (Table 1).

In conditions of weakening or crisis of national identity, regional identity can compete with it and, gaining a political hue, threaten the unity of the country. In a stable society with a stable national identity, regional identity does not come to the forefront in the hierarchy of territorial identities [2].

Under normal conditions, it manifests itself in the formation of a certain system of values and norms of behavior among the residents of the region. It can be found in local folklore, legends, myths, local interpretations of the history of the country, etc. However, as the results of our research show, even in conditions of political stability, the priority of local and regional identity over national identity is a quite typical phenomenon for rural areas not only of the deep territories of Russia but also its “new borderlands.”

There is a viewpoint that Russian culture has a significantly weakened capacity for self-organization of space, and it prefers not a sense of regionalism but “aspatiality,” i.e., non-spatiality. Aspatiality is a specifically reduced reaction of Russian culture to geographical space, in particular, to distance, border, and place. Proponents of this viewpoint emphasize the non-coincidence of the fact that in Russian culture local patriotism clearly fits within the framework of administrative units: “Indifference to place flows over to indifference to borders. Because of this, they fully surrender to those borders that the state establishes for them, and meekly direct their local patriotism to those guberniyas, oblasts, or krais that the Russian authorities carve out on the map” [3, p. 113].

An alternative to this viewpoint is the idea that “in Russia, as in many countries of the world, the administrative division, at least at the level of federation subjects, tends to coincide with historical-cultural regions” [4, p. 36]. Moreover, these historical-cultural regions are not generated by administrative borders but rather compel the adjustment of the internal division of the country to the established cultural boundaries. To identify regions of Russia corresponding to historical-cultural areas, it is proposed to use the criterion of the age of the territory, which “should be counted from the beginning of its mention as a formal or informal unit” [4, p. 37].

Both viewpoints have the right to exist, as the answer to the question of the interdependence of political-administrative and cultural borders is not so simple. But undoubtedly, from the perspective of forming territorial identity at any level, the historical maturity or stability of political-administrative borders, determined by the antiquity and duration of the existence of these borders, is of fundamental importance. Often, political-administrative borders of past eras serve as modern or relict cultural boundaries. By analogy, one can speak of both modern regional identity and territorial identity within the framework of historical-cultural regions, which is gradually erased in the mass consciousness due to the establishment of new administrative borders.

The informational base of this study includes the results of a series of sociological surveys conducted from 1999 to 2002 within the region representing the “new Russian borderland” almost along the entire length of the border of Russia with Estonia and Latvia, and partially with Belarus. This ethnocultural border in the 20th century served as a state border for only 30 years. However, in the preceding seven centuries, the opposite proportion was observed: for five centuries, the border was political, and only for two centuries (18th-19th centuries) did it have an administrative status.

The study was conducted in three stages. The first stage (1999-2000) included pilot sociological research at the level of several border administrative districts (N = 738, the sample is representative by gender and age). At the second stage, specialized sampling was applied in surveys in the same districts (N = 726, with an equal number of respondents in groups distinguished by gender and age). In the first two stages, population surveys (including questionnaires and interviews) were conducted in the cross-border area of Narva-Ivangorod at the junction of Estonia and the Leningrad region, the Pskov section of the Russian-Estonian border, as well as on a significant section of the border with Latvia, including its junction with the Russian-Belarusian border. The final survey in this series was conducted in March 2002 by the Sociological and Marketing Information Service (Pskov) and covered the entire population of the Pskov region (N=780, the sample is representative by gender and age).

The ethnosocial specificity of the border areas of the Pskov region is determined by noticeable kinship or friendly ties of local residents with the population of neighboring states. For example, every third resident of the districts adjacent to Estonia has relatives in that country, and every fifth has friends or acquaintances. A similar picture is observed in the districts bordering Belarus. Every fourth respondent in the extreme south of the region has Belarusians among their relatives. At the same time, almost every fifth resident of the districts adjacent to Belarus can speak Belarusian, and more than half of the local population understands this language.

The dynamics of administrative borders within the study region appear as follows. The Pskov region was established in 1944, but only its northern and northeastern modern borders (with the Leningrad and Novgorod regions) were formalized that year. The remaining borders (with the current Tver and Smolensk regions) were determined only in 1957-1958 after the liquidation of the Velikiye Luki region. In the central part of the region, temporary administrative borders appeared in the first half of the 20th century, the most significant of which in terms of forming regional identity can be considered the border of the Velikiye Luki region, which existed for 13 years.

In addition, two significant cultural boundaries run through the territory of the region, repeating the borders of the Pskov guberniya that existed for about one and a half centuries. The southern part of the region until 1924 was part of the Vitebsk guberniya (and earlier – of the Polotsk vicegerency, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, etc.). Moreover, the southern border of the Pskov guberniya at that time played the role of both an ethnic (Russian-Belarusian) border. A century ago, the proportion of the Belarusian population here significantly exceeded that of the Russians, and until the 1930s, a Russian-Belarusian ethnocontact zone existed in the southern part of the region. National statistics of the 1920s showed a fairly rapid “disappearance” of the Belarusian population here, which rather indicates a change in the ethnic self-consciousness (ethnic identification) of local residents.

The northern part of the region was part of the St. Petersburg (Petrograd, Leningrad) guberniya until 1927. In these areas, a Russian-Estonian ethnocontact zone existed for half a century (from the end of the 19th century to 1943), during which the proportion of Estonians remained at no less than 10% of the total population. The 1989 census revealed only 1% of the Estonian population here; our research yielded different results: among the surveyed indigenous residents, 3% identified as Estonians, and another 15% were individuals who identified as Russians but had Estonian ancestors.

Finally, the most ancient cultural boundary corresponding to the border of the medieval Pskov land delineates the “Pskov cultural core” in the western part of the former Pskov guberniya.

According to the results of our studies, the clear priority among all levels of territorial identity is given by the rural population of the border areas of the Pskov region to local identity (Table 2). Regional identity occupies the second place, and only national identity comes in third, with state (citizenship of Russia) and ethnic identities occupying roughly equal positions. Moreover, regional and national identities turned out to be less significant for the surveyed population than, for example, identity by age and profession.

It is also noteworthy that as one approaches the border with Estonia and Latvia, the significance of ethnic identity somewhat increases for the local population, which pushes state identity down to a lower tier.

The most important components of national identification for rural residents of the border areas are, firstly, language, and secondly, native land and nature. That is, even in national identification, understood quite broadly, significant space is allocated to territorial (local and regional) identity. Culture and historical past occupy the third and fourth places in the structure of national identity. Following these are such attributes as customs and rituals, character traits, appearance, and religion. Overall statehood occupies the last position among the components of national identification, which generally confirms the conclusion about the diminished role of citizenship in the overall structure of identity of the rural population living near a relatively young state border.

The peculiarities of national identification were revealed through a series of questions dedicated to stereotypical representations of Russia compared to neighboring countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus). Overall, the image of Russia is formed from such characteristics as strong, peace-loving, spiritual, and independent. Against this backdrop, Estonia and Latvia are seen as richer, more developed countries. However, when comparing Russia with Belarus, only three characteristics remain with the former (strong, independent, and spiritual), while Belarus is endowed with qualities such as peace-loving, developed, and rich. Nevertheless, the gap between these stereotypes (except for two contrasting characteristics: strong Russia and peace-loving Belarus) becomes minimal, indicating the closeness of the images of these two Slavic countries in contrast to the Baltic states (Table 3).

It should be noted that the images of Estonia and Latvia in the perception of Russians are virtually indistinguishable, rather corresponding to the image of any of the “Western countries.” In other words, the stereotypical representation of Russia compared to Estonia and Latvia reflects a higher level of territorial identity than national. In fact, in this case, we are dealing with a supranational – civilizational identity, which is confirmed by the responses of respondents to questions regarding ethnic stereotypes of Russians compared to Estonians, Latvians, and Belarusians (Table 4).

Compared to Estonians and Latvians, Russians are endowed with such character traits as cheerful, sociable, kind, friendly, patient, free, and tolerant. A minimal advantage in favor of Russians was given to such characteristics as patriotic and happy. It should be noted that the formation of these ethnic stereotypes is not influenced by either gender or age of the respondents, which leads to the idea of the dominant role in the ethnic identification of the population of the established cultural tradition over a long period of time, and only a secondary role of modern mass media and other factors.

The differences between the ethnic stereotypes of Estonians and Latvians, as well as in the case of state stereotypes, are minimal. A typical representative of these peoples, when compared to Russians, is seen as neat, cultured, well-mannered, restrained, rational, businesslike, wealthy, and law-abiding. Moreover, respondents with a higher level of education more frequently attributed such qualities to Estonians and Latvians. The only character trait that did not receive a clear advantage in favor of Russians or the peoples of the Baltic states was hard work.

The ethnic stereotypes of Estonians and Latvians fully fit into the image of the “man of Western culture,” which, as noted by L.D. Gudkov, is formed from a combination of meanings of activity, independence, and self-sufficiency. He also emphasizes that this image of the “Western man” should differ very little not only among representatives of Western European states but also correspond to the image of the “near European,” i.e., a representative of the Baltic states [1]. Our research confirmed this assertion.

Principally different stereotypes are formed when comparing typical representatives of the two Slavic and, moreover, Orthodox peoples – Russians and Belarusians. In their images, all the indicated character traits are largely equalized. The image of a Russian in comparison with a Belarusian noticeably adds such characteristics as neat, restrained, businesslike, law-abiding, compared to the Estonian and Latvian. When compared with a Belarusian, he noticeably approaches the image of a typical representative of the “man of Western culture.” As we can see, in the model of civilizational identity, which has poles “West-Russia,” the Baltic states tend to gravitate more towards the “West,” while Belarus tends towards “Russia,” although in a number of characteristics, a Russian person and Russia as a whole stand even closer to the image of the “Western world” than a Belarusian and Belarus. Based on this, it becomes clear that the national identity of Russians is most clearly expressed against the backdrop of contrast with the Baltic states and is significantly “blurred” when comparing Russia with Belarus.

To understand the spatial-temporal dynamics of regional identity among the population of the Pskov region, we studied how the long-established self-designation of local residents – “skobary” [1] spread across its territory.

Initially, the main area of this name was limited to the territory of the Pskov “clicking” dialects, roughly corresponding to the ancient “Pskov cultural core” within the medieval Pskov land (mainly in the basin of the Velikaya River). The use of the word “skobary” as a self-designation of the local population on the eastern and especially southeastern outskirts of the Pskov guberniya (including the city of Velikiye Luki) was noticeably less. In the northern part of the Pskov region, which previously belonged to the St. Petersburg guberniya, the word “skobary” as a self-designation was almost not used. For the population living south of the borders of the Pskov guberniya, the names “katsapy” and “Poles” were used [5].

From the 1920s to the 1950s, due to constant changes in administrative division, the area of use of the nickname “skobary” began to blur. After the Pskov region acquired its modern borders in 1958, the word “skobary” gradually began to spread across the entire territory of the Pskov region, going beyond the boundaries previously defined by gubernatorial borders. Thus, gubernatorial identity gradually began to be replaced by modern regional identity within the Pskov region. But only closer to the end of the 20th century, when the word “skobary” began to lose its negative connotation among the local population due to the passing of generations – the actual bearers of this nickname, it began to be used more frequently as a regional self-designation. Moreover, this word acquired a noticeable political hue, becoming a kind of symbol of local patriotism.

According to the results of a survey conducted in March 2002, 48% of residents of the Pskov region quite often use the self-designation “skobary,” while 30% do not use it at all (the remaining 22% of respondents use it very rarely or found it difficult to answer this question). In particular, it is used by 56% of natives of the Pskov region and 27% of individuals born outside the region. In Pskov, 53% of respondents identify as skobary, including about two-thirds of natives of the regional center.

Significantly more often, skobary identify themselves as older people (slightly more often men than women), living in rural areas and having a relatively lower level of education. The overwhelming majority of these people, when pronouncing the word “skobary,” feel pride for the Pskovites today. An ironic attitude towards this regional name is expressed mainly by more educated people, youth, and natives of other regions. Among young people (under 20 years old), the self-designation “skobary” is consciously used by only one-fifth of natives of the region and 5% of those from other regions of Russia, the CIS, and the Baltic states.

Returning to the spread of the self-designation “skobary” across the territory of the Pskov region, it should be noted that the half-century existence of new administrative borders was insufficient for this regional self-designation to be applied equally across the entire territory of the region. A vivid example can be the Pechory district, which has been part of the Pskov region since 1945, but from 1920 to 1940 was part of the independent Estonian Republic. If in the eastern part of the Pechory district, located closest to Pskov, more than half of the local residents identify as skobary, then in the western and southern parts of the district, adjacent to the borders with Estonia and Latvia, this share is only about one-third. Indigenous residents of the northern part of the region, who were part of the St. Petersburg guberniya from 1781 to 1927, and from 1927 to 1944 were part of the Leningrad region, also identify as skobary less frequently. Thus, the “Pskov” administrative period of this territory lasts just over half a century against the backdrop of a one and a half century “St. Petersburg-Leningrad” period. Nevertheless, near the former border of the Pskov guberniya, two-thirds of indigenous residents already identify as skobary, and only further north does this share decrease to half.

Even less often do residents of the southern part of the Pskov region, which until 1924 was part of the Vitebsk guberniya, identify as skobary, with the “Pskov” administrative period beginning only in 1957. Here, only one-third of local residents identify as skobary, while within the “Pskov cultural core,” their share reaches 75%. It is important to note that this self-designation is gradually beginning to take root in the southern part of the region in small district centers and their immediate surroundings, where about half of the surveyed local natives now identify as skobary.

Thus, the change in the semantic meaning of the regional name “skobary,” which previously served for cultural (Pskov “clicking” dialects) and gubernatorial identification, and now acts as a symbol of local patriotism, has given it an innovative character, allowing it to penetrate historically “non-skobary” territories, crossing centuries-old cultural boundaries. Acquiring a political hue, the regional name of the Pskovites gained new life, vibrant, but it is not excluded that it may be quite fleeting.

The frequency of using the self-designation “skobary” among respondents born outside the Pskov region depends on the duration of their residence in the region and their region of origin. Most often, skobary identify themselves as those from northern regions of Russia, as well as from Belarus and Ukraine, who have long settled in the Pskov region (on average more than 20 years ago). The least frequently are recent migrants (mainly after the collapse of the USSR) from the Baltic states, Central Asian countries, and Kazakhstan. Also, natives of the southern part of Russia rarely identify as skobary, although they have no less long adaptation period in Pskov land than those from northern Russia.

The features of regional identification manifest in the responses of respondents to questions regarding the assessment of the qualities of people living in the Pskov region. Natives consider themselves to be very sociable, kind, understanding of others, hardworking, patriotic, moral, in most cases responsible, but relatively passive and very individualistic. In contrast, those from other regions of Russia and former Soviet republics consider the residents of the Pskov region, unlike the self-assessment of Pskovites, to be slightly more moral and patriotic, but somewhat less hardworking, even more individualistic, passive, and careless.

The most contrasting evaluations of the qualities of Pskovites come from groups of recent migrants from the Baltic states and Central Asia. Migrants from Central Asia clearly overestimate, even compared to the Pskovites themselves, such qualities of the region’s residents as responsibility, businesslike, hard work, and morality. These same characteristics of Pskovites acquire a directly opposite sign for migrants from the Baltic states: irresponsible, careless, lazy, and immoral. On the other hand, migrants from the Baltic states, like those from Belarus and Ukraine, consider Pskovites to be more sociable and understanding of others compared to migrants from Central Asia, who, unlike all other groups of migrants, consider collectivism to be one of the qualities of the region’s residents.

The last example shows that migrants from former Soviet republics build their assessments of the qualities of residents of Russian regions based on their own life experience within fundamentally different cultural environments. For example, during our research in the almost entirely Russian-speaking city of Narva (Estonia), local Russians themselves pointed out that they clearly distinguish themselves from their compatriots living in Russia. The survey conducted in March 2002 among the residents of the Pskov region confirmed the objectivity of these statements. The most tolerant group among recent migrants to the Pskov region, equally well-disposed towards migrants regardless of their nationality, turned out to be those from the Baltic states, while the least tolerant were natives of southern Russia. Migrants from Central Asia and Kazakhstan are more tolerant towards non-Russian migrants, but are not as positively inclined towards Russian migrants.

In our study, an attempt was made to study local identity. About half of the rural residents of the border areas we surveyed believe that the local population has distinctive features. Natives of the Pskov region believe, for example, that the population of the area where they live is distinguished primarily by the specificity of dialects. This response was the most popular near obvious cultural borders (for example, near the state and simultaneously ethnic border, or between “oka” dialects in the north of the region and “aka” dialects in its remaining territory). The second place was taken by the response that local residents differ in behavior (character). Less significant for the natives of the region were such distinguishing features as culture (customs, holidays, etc.) and appearance.

In contrast to the natives of the Pskov region, migrants from other regions of Russia, as well as former Soviet republics, more often note the specificity of behavior (sometimes with a negative connotation) and the characteristics of the culture of Pskovites. However, the dialectal features of Pskovites as their distinguishing feature still occupy the first place, regardless of the category of migrants. The cultural specificity of the population of the Pskov region is more clearly recognized by migrants from European CIS countries and the Baltic states.

It should be noted that local identity, although it leads in the hierarchy of territorial identities in all categories of recent migrants to the Pskov region, often yields to identification by age and profession, especially for migrants from former Soviet republics. For those from Asian CIS countries, ethnic identity even takes precedence. Regional identity occupies the third or fourth place (depending on the category of migrants) among all types of territorial identity. The only exception is recent migrants from the Baltic states, who often have Pskov roots and therefore elevate regional identity to the second place. For those from other regions of Russia and European CIS countries, state identity rises to the second position instead of regional identity.

Thus, in everyday life, the rural population of the Pskov region prioritizes local identity and, as a result, builds a hierarchy of territorial identities “from the bottom up”: from local and regional to national and supranational (civilizational) identity. Only upon leaving their settlement does a person consciously prioritize higher levels of territorial identity (regional or national depending on the distance and nature of movement, the type of political-administrative and ethnocultural borders crossed). This conclusion is confirmed by the results of the survey of migrants to the Pskov region from other regions of Russia and former Soviet republics. In practice, this conclusion prompts a clarification of the diagnosis of interethnic relations, as the sharp, clearly expressed change in priorities in favor of national (or ethnic) identity against local and regional may indicate an increase in ethnopolitical tension in the country or individual subjects of the federation. The correct diagnosis of interethnic relations is of particular importance not only for the multinational regions of the country but also for territories adjacent to the state borders of Russia, which are also the most important ethnocultural frontiers.

Overall, our research demonstrates that state, administrative, and ethnic borders play a significant role in the formation and subsequent dynamics of national and regional identity. In this regard, characteristics of borders such as their historical maturity and degree of permeability, determined by the ratio of their barrier and contact functions, are particularly important. And from this perspective, the example of the Pskov region is very indicative, as it not only borders three young states but also has numerous internal historical-cultural borders left as a legacy by former political-administrative and ethnic frontiers.

REFERENCES:

1. Geopolitical Position of Russia: Representations and Reality. Edited by V.A. Kolosov. Moscow: Art-Courier, 2000.

2. Oracheva O.I. Regional Identity: Myth or Reality? // Regional Self-Consciousness as a Factor in the Formation of Political Culture in Russia. Moscow: MONF, 1999. pp. 36-43.

3. Smirnyagin L.V. Territorial Morphology of Russian Society as a Reflection of Regional Sentiment in Russian Culture // Regional Self-Consciousness as a Factor in the Formation of Political Culture in Russia. Moscow: MONF, 1999. pp. 108-115.

4. Krylov M.P. The Concept of “Region” in the Cultural and Historical Space of Russia // Geography and Regional Policy. Part 1. Smolensk: Publishing House of Smolensk State University, 1997. pp. 32-37.

5. Herd A.S. Introduction to Ethnolinguistics. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University, 1995.

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[1] Legends testify to two folk versions of the origin of the word “skobary.” The first associates the self-designation of Pskovites with their haircut in the Middle Ages (“not sewn with bast, not cut with a skoba”). The second is also related to the word “skoba” – an iron object resulting from blacksmithing. However, the most recognized version in scientific circles is that there was a gradual transition from the word “Pskov” to the name “skobary” through the replacement of individual sounds and parts of the word, largely due to the specificity of Pskov dialects. Linguists suggest the following chain of sound replacement in the transition “Pskov – skobskoy”: replacing “v” in the middle of the word with “p” (since a more realistic replacement of “v” with “f” is alien to Pskov dialects); dropping the first sound “p”; a new replacement in the middle of the word “p” with “b.” As a result, reverse word formation could have occurred: “skobskoy – skoby – skobary.” It was not the Pskovites themselves who contributed to the creation of such a name, but their neighbors, who sought to distinguish themselves from the inhabitants of Pskov land. Therefore, the concept of “skobary” had a somewhat derogatory connotation: “Skobary are the most bast-shoddy, and also Novgorodian” (See Manakov A.G., Kulakov I.S. Historical Geography of Pskov Region (Population, Culture, Economy). Moscow: Publishing House “Varyag.” 1994. pp. 162-163).